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No discipline can claim a greater impact on contemporary political theorizing 
than that of economics, whether that theorizing concerns the study of legislatures, 
elections, international affairs, or judicial processes. This essay questions, 
however, whether this impact is a form of "economic imperialism," or the logical 
development of two disciplines whose artificial separation in the first part of this 
century merely allowed the development and refinement of the rational choice paradigm, 
unencumbered by the necessity for considering all of reality. Indeed, applications to 
specific substantive political matters -- most notably collective and cooperative 
processes where game theory proves most relevant -- reveal the paradigm's 
incompleteness. These applications, however, illuminate the necessary theoretical 
extensions, which is no longer the sole domain of the economist. 
The Reintegra tion of Political Science and Economics 
and The Presumed Imperialism of Economic Theory 
In this century, the study of politics has been the beneficiary as well as the victim 
of many intellectual currents from other disciplines, most notably sociology, law, and 
psychology. But no discipline has had a greater impact than economics or can today 
challenge economics's preeminence as a sister discipline. This influence and parallelism 
are due, first, to the political scientist's and the economist's desire to understand the 
same general phenomena -- the allocation of scarce and valued resources by mechanisms 
of human creation. Second, unlike sociology or psychology, both disciplines are concerned 
with specific, readily identifiable mechanisms. The focus of economics is markets and the 
institutions that arise in response to general market forces, whereas elections, 
representative institutions, and decentralized systems such as those that describe 
international politics are what concern political science. Contributing importantly to the 
synergism between the two disciplines is the discovery by political scientists that the 
rational choice paradigm commonly associated with economics offers a compelling 
perspective with which to begin a deductive and rigorous study of the phenomena that 
concern them, and the discovery by economists that the "non-market" mechanisms studied 
by political scientists decisively effect the existence, structure, and performance of 
markets. Thus, the economist now recognizes that political institutions and processes 
must be understood in the same terms as markets, and political scientists have been made 
aware of the possibility of integrating their research with economic principles. 
Despite the failure of scholars from earlier centuries to distinguish sharply between 
these two disciplines, the first half of our century witnessed a division and intellectual 
specialization with both unfortunate and beneficial consequences. The division was 
unfortunate because of the self-evident fact that political and economic activity, however 
defined, cannot be separated in the description of any society. The hard-learned lesson 
of those we might label "political conservatives," for example, is that it is the state that 
establishes the context in which markets are permitted to operate, with the state standing 
ready at any time to upset any particular market outcome. People are not merely 
consumers and producers, they are also citizens in a variety of polities that are equipped 
not only to regulate markets, but also to expropriate directly the resources that markets 
allocate. Thus, it is impossible to predict market outcomes without also predicting the 
political responses that alternative outcomes engender. On the other hand, the hard­
learned lesson of the left, and of Marxism in particular, is that whatever institutional 
structure is imposed for the state, the laws governing market forces cannot be abrogated 
-- the forces of supply and demand operate regardless of culture, socialization patterns, 
ideology, and political system. 
But the separation into two distinct disciplines was not without its beneficial 
consequences. Most importantly, it permitted the economist to proceed unencumbered by 
the necessity for considering all of reality. Left to study the particularized forces of 
markets and the allocation of a specific numerarire, money, the requisite details of a 
paradigm were uncovered. Axioms of choice and preference, along with formal 
representations of preference and alternative choice contexts were developed. The 
separation thereby accomplished an abstraction that might not otherwise have occurred, 
and it permitted the economist to develop that most powerful of social theories-­
classical microeconomics. 
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Because it is in the domain of microeconomic theory that the mathematical structure 
of the rational choice paradigm first appears, it thus seems appropriate to regard the 
adoption of this paradigm by political scientists as "economic imperialism." Of course, 
some persons might object to this supposition with the argument that we can discern this 
paradigm in the writings of political scientists such as Arthur Bentley, David Truman, 
Robert Dahl, Hans Morgenthau, Charles Lindbloom, and V.0. Key, and that despite 
academia's propensity to promulgate disciplinary boundaries within the bureaucratic 
structure of universities, the division between economists and political scientists was 
always more apparent than real. But the case for imperialism is supported by observing 
that Bentley and others did not incorporate the deductive rigor of economics, and that the 
beginnings of the interdisciplinary synergism that is most apparent to us today is 
commonly identified as the relatively short and remarkable period from 1957 to 1962-­
the period marking the publication of four seminal volumes: Duncan Black's ( 1958) Theory 
of Committees and Elections, Anthony Downs's (1957) An Economic Theory o f  Democracy, 
William H. Riker's (1962) The Thedry of Political Coalitions, and James Buchanan and 
Gordon Tullock's (1962) The Calculus of Consent (although it is reasonable to argue that 
Kenneth Arrow's Social Choice andindividual Values, published in 1951, and Mancur 
Olson's The Logic of Collective Action, published in 1968, are members of the set). 
Today the research stimulated by these volumes is published across the full gamut of 
journals that represent the mainstream of both disciplines, and few people can keep 
abreast of it and the attendant flow of articles, books, and working papers. In this flow 
the impact of the rational choice paradigm on political science is now fully apparent. By 
any accounting, an increasing percentage of essays in political science journals are 
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designed either to explicitly extend the paradigm of rational choice or are set in that 
paradigm's context. Further, the labels "formal political theorist" or "positive political 
theorist" are not applied to political scientists who simply use mathematics in their 
arguments; rather, these labels are reserved for those who specifically work within the 
paradigm. 
It appears, then, that economics, by design or otherwise, is the preeminent 
imperialistic discipline of the social sciences, or at least of political science. But we 
should ask: Is this imperialism real? Did economics uniquely develop and refine the 
rational choice paradigm? And if we can detect any imperialism, does it extend beyond 
the mere exporting of this paradigm? 
Answering such questions, and measuring the nature and extent of the influence of 
economics on the study of politics as well as the influences of political science on 
economics is important not only because we might like to contribute to the history of 
ideas, but also because such knowledge provides clues about the future of the two 
disciplines. Learning how political scientists and economists interact allows us to 
anticipate theoretical changes and, as part of the argument of this essay, it also permits 
us to anticipate the form of the eventual reintegration of two disciplines. Knowing where 
this integration is incomplete reveals the inadequacies of theoretical structure. 
One theme of this essay is that if there is imperialism, it is of a rather simple sort 
in which the use of the 18th and 19th century rationalist paradigm of social theorists 
(political and economic) is once again serving its integrative function. The presumed 
imperialism of economics, then, does not take the form of the transportation of economic 
models and laws into political science, although some have tried this (with but modest 
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success). Rather, it takes the form of the political scientist once again explicitly using a 
theoretical view that previously had unified the disciplines and that the economist has 
refined these past seventy five years, and modifying it to serve the substantive purposes 
that are of special concern to his discipline so that the study of political institutions can 
once again be integrated with the study of economic institutions. In fact, this imperialism 
takes the form of the economist realizing that his is not a special discipline that can be 
is�lated and studied without some account of politics, and that the refinements and 
extensions of the paradigm offered by political scientists are an essential part of economic 
theory. In this essay, then, we will try to gain some perspective on these efforts and on 
the main theoretical currents currently coursing through both disciplines. 
Our discussion, however, has a second theme, one that becomes more apparent as we 
examine the application of the paradigm to political phenomena. That theme is the 
argument that the theoretical apparatus of economics suffers from fundamental theoretical 
inadequacies. Moreover, those inadequacies are rendered most evident in the study of 
politics. Hence, the full development of the paradigm requires an attention to the 
substantive concerns of both disciplines. The inadequacies of special concern involve the 
treatment of strategic and cooperative action. Game theory, which is that part of the 
paradigm that concerns such actions, is only now, after languishing as a theoretical 
backwater of economics, being developed as in a theoretically satisfactory way. Later we 
show how political science contributes to this development owing to the special problems 
common to nearly all political processes. 
I. The Early Resistance to Intellectual I1nasion 
Although its details are constantly questioned, criticized, defended, and reformulated, 
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the rational choice paradigm -- summarized by the assumption of methodological 
individualism and the hypothesis of individual action motivated by self-interest -- forms 
the thread uniting the two disciplines. Indeed, it is the adaptation of this paradigm to 
the study of political processes that is commonly cited as the essence of the presumed 
imperialism in political science of economic theory. As we note earlier, it is tempting to 
assert that this imperialism is illusionary, that Bentley, Dahl, Key and many others also 
abided by it, and that the economist's contribution has been merely to supply a 
mathematical formalization -- aided in no small part by non-economists such as von 
Neumann and Savage. Nevertheless, we cannot ignore the fact that the writings of Black, 
Downs, Riker, and Buchanan and Tullock were not received with broad acceptance in 
political science. Scholars who followed the behavioralist tradition and who gained their 
theoretical sustenance from disciplines such as psychology and sociology, for example, 
were at best skeptical about the paradigm's relevance in the belief that its definition of 
rationality was too restrictive, that its concept of self-interest assumed away motivations 
such as altruism, and that the hypothesis of methodological individualism precluded 
consideration of "group-oriented" ideas such as socialization, norms, and culture. Also, 
those who were concerned with the substance of public policy and foreign affairs saw the 
formalism associated with the paradigm -- the assumptions required to render a 
mathematical argument tractable -- as lethal impediments to any adequate understanding of 
their subject. Hence, instances of the paradigm's explicit use in political science were 
often isolated at professional meetings with panels devoted to "formal political theory," 
"mathematical models," or "public choice." Only infrequently in the 1960's or the early 
1970's did we witness the participation of the paradigm's proponents on panels dealing 
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with traditional topics such as legislative processes, elections, the presidency, international 
affairs, the courts, or the analysis of the formation of public policy. 
How do we reconcile the fact, then, that although central practitioners of the trade 
implicitly used the paradigm, its explicit adaptation to the discipline was strongly resisted? 
The speculative answer to this question is two-fold. First, because those who followed in 
the intellectual footsteps of Downs et al emphasized deductive rigor -- even pure 
mathematics -- at the apparent expense of substantive content, many applications were 
viewed as mere mathematical manipulations. Even when such rigor was applied to the 
development of a consistent body of theory -- most notably, the various election models 
based on Downs's An Economic Theory of Democracy (referred to as "spatial models of 
elections") -- the results were unappreciated because the basic theory under development 
was deemed to have questionable legitimacy by those who abided by a different paradigm. 
But the use of pure mathematics alone cannot account for the political scientist's 
skepticism -- statistical methodologies gained broad acceptance, and often legitimated 
learning the mathematician's craft. Instead, the second part of our answer concerns the 
political scientist's lack of understanding about the role of mathematics in scientific 
explanation, and about the nature of the development of general theory. Our answer also 
concerns the natural and healthy reluctance to abandon one approach in favor of another 
until the usurper's relative value is evident. 
We ought to keep in mind that the paradigm's entry into the discipline was not 
preceded by any readily apparent insight that lit the way for all to see. No 
understanding of a specific empirical phenomenon compelling others to follow. Neither a 
great discovery such as the identification of DNA nor a critical experiment such as the 
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measurement of the speed of light preceded whatever imperialism was to follow. Instead, 
the paradigm's entry was marked imperceptibly at the time by the formalization of ideas 
that seemed, at best, 'reasonable' -- that candidates are drawn, unless constrained by 
special interests and the threat of abstention, to advocate the preference of the median 
voter on an election's salient issue; that one should not build too large a coalition or 
there will be no losers from whom to expropriatl'; that committees might agree to some 
middle position when debating a single issue; and that political institutions are the product 
of the self-interest of those who establish them. Although the authors of these ideas 
began a revolution within a discipline, these ideas hardly grab the intellectual imagination. 
Indeed, in a discipline possessing a surfeit of ideas but not of theory, they are easily lost 
in the noise or, as is almost always the case with general theoretical ideas, their 
intellectual antecedents can be found in a great many places. 
It was not a particular substantive insight that was brought to political science from 
economics; rather, it was a method for the conduct of research tied to a general and 
malleable theoretical structure. Because this method was distinct from many of the 
established research methodologies in political science, Downs, Riker, Buchanan, and 
Tullock were not viewed as the intellectual kin of Bentley, Truman, Morgenthau, Dahl, and 
Key. Understanding gained of experience and time consuming empirical study, and 
explanation based on wisdom and ad hoc speculation no longer suffices with this paradigm. 
Instead, hypotheses had to be shown to follow logically from explicit assumptions before 
they qualified for a test of empirical validity. Hence, the initial rejection of this method 
as mere mathematical manipulations failed to appreciate the fact that the mathematics 
surrounding this structure merely represented the desire to understand phenomena 
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generally, logically, and scientifically. 
We might assert that the 'innovations' introduced by Downs, et al went largely 
unrecognized and were even boldly resisted because political scientists was simply too 
unscientific a discipline to appreciate its promise. Certainly, many natural scientists do 
not consider political science today (or even economics) to be a science, but the 
accusation of 'unscientific' as a pejorative label neglects the fact that political science is 
a discipline that has had its share of innovative thinkers. We can sympathize with those 
who viewed the erection of mathematical edifices as more often than not constituting an 
exercise in logic with a substantive significance not exceeding the mathematical puzzles in 
the back of any issue of Scientific American. More fundamentally, however, the early 
skepticism seems warranted and legitimately in the spirit of any scientific enterprise. If 
it is a general theoretical perspective that is the 'new idea' -- a more efficient route to 
explanation and understanding -- then no single research effort proves the case. Instead, 
unswerving cynics as well as potential converts can rightly demand an extensive 
theoretical development before acquiescing. Data and ideas must be demonstrably 
organizable in some more useful form, and new unanticipated insights must follow before 
paradigms change or one becomes dominant. 
2. Successes of the Paradigm 
We can speculate and write about the presumed imperialism of economics today, 
nevertheless, because of some very real accomplishments in political theory 
accomplishments that include the development of a formal theoretical structure for 
studying elections, the impact of congressional procedures and organizing principles, the 
genesis and maintenance of political institutions, the flow of international processes, and 
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the formation and justification of public policy. A review of those accomplishments is 
enlightening, but not because it illustrates the imperialism of economics. Rather, any such 
review brings into question whether such imperialism actually exists or, if it does exist, 
whether it is the imperialism of 19th century social theory. 
Certainly, Downs's seminal contribution to the study of elections can be credited as 
the first major inroad into political theory of the economist's paradigm with its associated 
mathematical formalism. Although an exhaustive literature search might require the 
citation of prior inroads, it was the research into the spatial theory of elections and its 
subsequent publication in the l 960's in traditional political science journals that mark the 
sustained effort at developing a complete theoretical structure for at least one important 
political as against economic institution. But as we begin to penetrate this theory, the 
contributions of economics beyond the supply of its paradigm in the form of the 
assumption that candidates and parties are motivated principally by the desire to win 
elections and that voters act to maximize the benefits that they derive from government, 
become obscure. 
One important contribution of the spatial theorist is the formal conceptualization of 
preferences that it offers. In microeconomic theory, the representation of commodity 
bundles by an Euclidean coordinate system and the summary of preferences over these 
bundles by preference sets or indifference curves are, together, a powerful analytic tool. 
The simple proposition that commodity bundles that maximize a consumer's utility are 
characterized, under suitable assumptions about preference and people's tradeoffs across 
commodities, by the tangency of an indifference contour and a budget constraint, marks 
the beginning of the use of mathematics in economics and the scientific generality that 
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mathematics affords. Indeed, the simple notion of an indifference curve in conjunction 
with the idea of tangency to a budget constraint gives rise to the application of Kuhn­
Tucker maximization conditions and to a plethora of ideas that have a mathematical 
representation, such as homogenous goods, consumer surplus, and elastic and inelastic 
demand. 
Similarly, the representation of political issues by a similar coordinate system and 
the summary of voters' preferences over the issues by indifference curves with interior 
satiation points (e.g., concentric circles or ellipses) is an equally powerful device for those 
who seek to model political processes. Instead of viewing voter's decisions as "the 
product" of childhood socialization or partisan loyalties, those choices are explained by 
mathematical proximity to candidates on issues, broadly defined, and victorious candidates 
are characterized by the positioning of "median lines" and the like in this space. This 
representation, like the economist's, immediately gives rise to the development or 
application of mathematical ideas such as multidimensional medians, distributions of ideal 
points, and metrics for the representation of preferences. 
But we should ask about the source of this preference representation. Briefly, that 
representation begins with Duncan Black's notion of "single-peaked" preferences on a 
political issue -- preferences that are characterized by an internal satiation point-­
which he introduced as a means for escaping the dilemma of welfare economics that 
Arrow's Impossibility Theorem posed. Today we can deduce this idea from classical 
microeconomic representations. In the classical representation, consumers are 
characterized by the assumption that "more is preferred to less" and by indifference 
contours that represent tradeoffs between distinct commodities. The preferred commodity 
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bundle -- the point corresponding to the tangency of the "highest" such curve to a budget 
constraint -- is then determined by the consumer's income and the market prices of the 
goods in questions. Since, given income and prices, each consumer is dictator over his 
choice, this tangency marks the consumer's decision and the "market outcome" with 
respect to that consumer. But if, as in politics, the goods are publicly supplied and if 
their level of supply is dictated according to a 111echanism such as majority rule, then we 
must have a complete accounting of preferenc"' over the feasible set (budget constraint) 
since a consumer (voter, committee member, or legislator) may have to make compromises 
with others before a final bundle is chosen. If we make the usual microeconomic 
assumptions about preference and tradeoffs, then preferences over the budget constraint 
are "single-peaked" -- the consumer's ideal lies at the point of tangency, and preference 
decreases as we move along the constraint on either side away from this point (Ordeshook 
1986). The central questions of politics, then, concern how political institutions such as 
elections, representative assemblies, and committees, in conjunction with the procedural 
details of these institutions, translate such preferences into a social decision. 
This derivation of "political preferences" from "economic preferences" might be taken 
as evidence of economic imperialism, but in fact the derivation occurred long after the 
use of a spatial preference representation gained widespread acceptance in political 
theorizing. Indeed, it is this author's experience that many economists regarded the 
notion of an internal satiation point as merely a peculiar special case, and thereby 
resisted the supposition that general theorizing could proceed with it. But with this 
derivation, we now see that such preferences are not merely a special case; rather, they 
follow from the character of political institutions that distinguish them from decentralized 
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markets. 
With the formal representation of election processes that spatial preferences 
provides, formal political theorists maintained the analytic mode of the rational choice 
paradigm by hypothesizing a primary objective for key decision makers. Replacing the 
behavioralist view of people as black boxes that somehow reflected earlier experiences, 
political actors were modeled more clearly as active decision making agents. Candidates 
maximized the probability of election, and voters maximized the consumptive utility of the 
candidates' policies. The study of electoral processes then devolved Jess on measuring and 
weighing potential elements of the black box, and more on generalizing the structure of 
models, and on testing the implications of alternative hypotheses about people's goals-­
the goals of citizens and of candidates. 
Despite this parallelism, however, initial developments gave rise to what appeared to 
be a great disappointment. Specifically, nearly all election models failed to yield the 
simple type of equilibrium found in microeconomic models of perfectly competitive markets 
(for a general survey see Enelow and. Hinich 1985). Unless very restrictive conditions are 
imposed (such as that the election concerns a single issue or that the distribution of 
voter ideal points in the policy space was radially symmetric), there is no equilibrium 
platform for candidates -- every election platform can be defeated by some other election 
platform -- and, thus, there is no specific outcome that can be described as directly 
implied by preferences and institutional arrangement. And matters become even more 
muddled if we admit the possibility of more than two candidates or parties, if various 
forms of abstention are permitted, if we look at campaigns as a sequence of elections in 
which candidates must first secure the nominations of their parties, and if we take 
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account of the incomplete information about politics that characterizes voters. 
This initial disappointment, however, soon gave way to new theoretical developments. 
Briefly, political theorists concluded from their unsuccessful attempts at replicating the 
equilibrium results found in microeconomic theory that research should pursue two avenues 
that were generally regarded in economics as refinements of their theory, and not as 
centerpieces -- an elaboration of the abstract description of elections to include a more 
dynamic element (cf. Kramer 1977), and the development of more general notions of 
equilibrium (cf. McKelvey and Ordeshook 1979). The result of such efforts to date has 
been a focus on the second avenue (but not a rejection of the first), accompanied by the 
application of ideas drawn directly from noncooperative game theory and aided by the 
development of other ideas drawn from social choice theory such as the uncovered set (cf. 
Miller 1980, and McKelvey 1986). 
This change in research intent is important for understanding the influences of the 
two disciplines on each other. The early applications of game theory to economics 
generally sought to show how old results could be reformulated and generalized with an 
alternative structure (for example, that the core of a market game contracts to the 
competitive equilibrium as the number of consumers increases). But as it became apparent 
that the classical equilibrium results of microeconomics could not be replicated in political 
models, the development and generalization of game theory itself became a central activity 
of political theorizing. Although the general idea that key actors are rationally pursuing 
various objectives is common to the economist's models of markets and the political 
scientist's models of elections, profoundly important differences in theoretical emphasis 
then emerged. 
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A closer look at a particular model permits us to emphasize these points. Presently, 
we are seeing the importation of ideas from rational expectations models of markets so 
that we can better understand how democracies function in the incomplete information 
environments that characterize electorates (McKelvey and Ordeshook 1985, 1986). But 
aside from the initial insight that information is often obtained from cues and that these 
cues follow a dynamic that can yield, under the right circumstances, an equilibrium that 
corresponds to what we would observe if everyone were perfectly informed, no specific 
law or theorems can be borrowed to complete the theoretical enterprise. Instead, 
modeling must proceed "from scratch" so that it is adapted to the specific situation under 
consideration. In the case of elections, although we can think of the cues provided by 
public opinion polls and the endorsements of interest groups as offering signals similar to 
the signals provided by price in financial markets, the precise way in which these 
mechanisms operate is quite different owing to the fact that markets and elections are 
organized differently. Because there may be decision makers with a special influence on 
parameters (e.g., candidates and interest groups), we must look at the opportunities for 
strategic misrepresentation of preferences; and because elections are "infrequent events," 
we must pay closer heed to the temporal dynamics governing convergence to an 
equilibrium. 
What we want to emphasize here is not the details of theoretical developments, but 
rather the fact that political scientists (and at least one statistician) were at the 
forefront of the effort to formulate a rigorous deductive theory of democratic elections, 
and that this research did not consist of the mere application of ideas borrowed from 
economics. First, we see a radical revision in the representation of preferences. Second, 
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we find either the development of new equilibrium concepts that appear wholly within the 
discipline of political science, or we see that preexisting notions of equilibrium that are 
originally deemed tangential to the economist's principle concerns becoming central to 
political theory. 
It is also interesting to note the different responses of economists and political 
scientists to the election theory that Downs's volume began. Perhaps the simplest, least 
general, but most widely cited result is the Median Voter Theorem, which states that if a 
two-candidate majority rule election concerns a single issue, if the information of voters 
about candidates and of candidates about voters is perfect, if all citizens vote, and if 
there are no constraints on candidate strategies, then both candidates should converge to 
the electorate's median preference. Political scientists agree that such a model captures 
but a small part of the forces that operate in even the simplest election and thus their 
instinct has been to generalize the result to include multiple issues, nonvoting, incomplete 
information, interest group influences, and nomination procedures. Economists, on the 
other hand, often take the result as an excuse to eliminate politics altogether from their 
analyses. With a quick reference to the result, levels of consumption of goods and 
services in a consumer's utility function that are labeled public, as well as the taxes that 
constrain individual budgets, are assumed to be dictated by a median preference. Thus, 
the economist's contribution falls short, and provides but the initial structure and 
perspective. 
The empirical testing and application of spatial theory tells much the same story. 
Although we might again cite the spread of econometric techniques as another instance of 
economic imperialism, the imperatives of poli1 ic·:il theory caused those methods to be 
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modified, and in some instance completely supplanted by new technologies. The very 
nature of spatial theory requires a distinct methodology for estimating preferences. But 
economics was largely devoid of appropriate methods, and although early efforts leaned 
heavily on the multidimensional scaling technologies borrowed from psychology, it is now 
apparent that new and more sophisticated methodologies must be developed. Thus, 
although we cannot dispute the extensive application of econometrics, we also find the 
adaptation of methods to the particular theoretical structures of politics. 
This story is repeated again by a review of the research inspired by Arrow and 
Black, except that here the effort involves an even more diverse collection of scholars 
drawn not only from economics and political science, but from philosophy as well. To 
give some coherence to this research, it is convenient to divide it artificially into two 
categories - � social choice theory and the study of committees. We can take social choice 
theory to mean the normative study of social welfare and its axiomatic relationship to 
individual preferences. Again, the mode of analysis is primarily 'economic' with its 
dependence on individuals as the primary units of analysis and its assumption that 
individuals seek to maximize utility based on these preferences. But after this is said and 
after the seminal contribution of Arrow is cited, it is difficult to assert that economics is 
the "home base" of even a majority of subsequent research. 
Perhaps the most important and general result to follow Arrow's (1951) Impossibility 
Theorem -- the proof that most reasonable rules for aggregating individual preferences 
into a social preference need not yield a transitive social preference relation -- is Gibbard 
(J 97 l) and Satterthwaite's (J 97 l )  result about the manipulability of aggregation 
mechanisms. Following Arrow's axiomatic approach this result establishes that reasonable 
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rules are manipulable -- that for a broad class of social choice mechanisms, circumstance 
can arise in which one or more persons will not find it in their interest to reveal their 
sincere preferences over alternatives. This result, of course, places strategy, and thus 
game theory, at the heart of the study of decision making in social processes. But 
Gibbard is not an economist; rather, he is a philosopher teaching in a philosophy 
department. And the extension of Arrow's theorem to cyclic preferences (as against the 
weaker form of intransitive social orders) was accomplished by another philosopher, 
Thomas Schwartz, teaching in a political science department and published in the eclectic 
journal, Theory and Decision. Economists such as Amartya Sen, Peter Fishburn, and 
Charles Plott have made seminal contributions to social choice theory, but what followed 
the publication of Arrow's volume is less the imperialism of economic thought and more 
the development of a new subdiscipline with roots in a great many disciplines. 
With respect to the study of committees, Duncan Black's research is seminal and is 
closely connected to Arrow's in that Black sought to formulate an empirically viable 
violation of Arrow's "universal admissability of preference" axiom that escaped the dilemma 
of intransitive social preference. But the differences between Black and Arrow's research 
are important, and for that reason Black's work has had a more profound impact on 
political theory's development. Arrow sought to delineate the general properties (if not 
the impossibility) of social welfare functions. But normative theory can play only a small 
role in a discipline not yet armed with a universally accepted descriptive theory. Black's 
research, on the other hand, was more descriptive in its intent, and can be viewed 
retrospectively as following in the tradition of classical microeconomic theory. There, 
specific topological assumptions about consumer preferences permit us to deduce the 
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existence of equilibrium outcomes (and their properties) in a particular institutional 
arrangement -- unregulated competitive markets. Black's seminal contribution -- in The 
Theory of Committees and Electio1is as well as in his short monograph with R.A. Newing 
(1951), Committee Decisions with Complementary Evaluation, which predates even Arrow's 
work -- was, as we have already noted, to supply a conceptualization of preferences 
(single peaked and spatial) that is especially germane to politics and which provides the 
basis for a genuine "micropolitical theory." 
But before we cite Black's work as an instance of economic imperialism, we should 
also note that Black can hardly be classified as a 'mainstream' economist, and were it not 
for the interest that his research generates in political science, that research almost 
certainly would go unappreciated. Indeed, much of the research on committees that 
follows Black's lead is conducted by political scientists. Fused with the insights into the 
theoretical nature of voting provided Robin Farguharson in The Theory of Voting, and 
fused as well with the Downsian hypothesis that the primary objective of legislators is to 
secure reelection, that research is the basis for what political scientists call the "new 
institutionalism." 
Briefly, this new institutionalism is a response to the implicit determinism of the 
behavioralists, whose "revolution" after World War II is seen as a response to the nearly 
atheoretical, descriptive mode of political science then dominant. But that earlier mode 
focused also on political institutions -- the structure of legislatures, electoral rules, 
Constitutional provisions, and the like -- which is a disciplinary emphasis that somehow 
was lost in the definition, measurement, and correlation of "social class," "partisan 
identification," "attitudes," "childhood socialization," "norms," "socio-economic status," and 
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the like. Contemporary research is a synthesis that does not reject the insights of 
behavioral research. Indeed, it depends on them for understanding the underlying nature 
of preferences and perceptions. But this synthesis examines attitudes, preferences, and 
perceptions in the context of the constraints set by institutions. These institutions, in 
turn, (e.g., legislative committee structures, the existence of regulatory agencies, 
budgetary procedures, agenda and other voting rules) are viewed as endogenously 
determined by individual preferences, tradition, and transaction costs as well as important 
determinants of individual preferences alternative actions. Thus, "with everything 
connected to everything else," the study of institutions that emerges as the hallmark of 
modern political theory holds the potential of being the base for a grand synthesis of all 
of the intellectual traditions in political science. 
Once again, then, although economics provides the paradigmatic structure and 
perhaps even the initial insight about the conceptualization of outcomes (Euclidean) and 
the corresponding representation of preferences, its "imperialism" stops short of the actual 
taking-over of a discipline. No theorems from economics are grafted onto political theory. 
Rather, after the initial insight about outcomes, preferences, and the motivations of choice 
are accepted, assumptions particular to the political institutions under investigation are 
developed and theorems are established by political scientists, with at most the occasional 
foray of an errant economist into the area. Indeed, the results established here are 
generally of a different flavor than those found in economics. For example, it is now 
understood that with multiple issues, majority rule equilibria in the form of Condorcet 
winners -- outcomes that defeat all others in a majority vote or which cannot be defeated 
are generically rare. However, various procedural devices, such as voting on issues one 
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at a time, or agendas such as those found in the U.S. Congress that pair alternatives 
against each other in some specific order, can yield a determinate outcome. But now, 
learning the properties of such outcomes must follow the logic of Gibbard and 
Satterthwaite's results about strategic manipulability -- a logic that is irrelevant to 
microeconomic models in which the topic of interdependent choice is rendered mute by 
"appropriate" assumptions. Specifically, this logic must model the strategic sophistication 
of voters and their knowledge and beliefs about the preferences of others. 
3. The Political Scientist's Contribution 
To this point our survey suggests that although individual economists and their 
theorems are not imperialistic, the spread of the paradigm is a "one way street" of 
fundamental ideas -- from economics to political science. However, economics itself is 
being changed in the process. Although politics does not have a paradigm to transport to 
economics, it does contribute a concern, as we have just seen, with specific types of 
institutions and with the paradigm's inadequacies for studying those institutions. 
Perhaps no assumption contributed more to the development of classical 
microeconomic economic theory and to contemporary ,·,·unomic thought than the 
assumption that there are a sufficient number of consuml'rs and firms in markets that no 
decision maker affects price. This assumption decouple' ilt•cisions and removes from the 
scene a great bugaboo -- interdependent decision making. With this bugaboo absent, 
classical decision theory is all that the economist needs to pursue his craft, and a single 
course in calculus or in real variable analysis suffices to permit the student to 
comprehend professional manuscripts. 
The specific part of the paradigm that is designed to wrestle with the issue of 
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interdependent decision making i s  game theory. However, despite the fact that this 
bugaboo cannot be removed from any other social process, all but a handful of economists, 
for nearly twenty years, resisted an extension of their paradigm to this theory. And in 
this resis1:1nce we find a failure of the economist to develop his paradigm fully. 
This resistance has several explanations. First, there is the fact that game theory 
once again reveals the necessity of cardinal, as against the weaker ordinal 
conceptualizations of utility. Although the theory survives without cardinal utility 
(preferences must then be defined over lottery spaces rather than over a simple outcome 
space), the paradigm's parsimony is greatly diminished. Moreover, experimental, 
theoretical, and empirical explorations into cardinal utility reveal problems with the 
concept of utility, both ordinal and cardinal. Second, the early applications of game 
theory to economics revealed few new theoretical insights. The various parts of game 
theory were deemed as either irrelevant to the central problems of duopoly and oligopoly, 
or as merely providing unsatisfactory answers. (There is, of course, a "chicken-and-the­
egg-problem" here that we cannot resolve. Did game theory fail to yield new theoretical 
insights because economists did not pay sufficient heed to that theory, or vise versa?) 
While economists fretted over the necessity of cardinal utility and over alternative 
ideas for modeling the specific forms of interdependent choice occasioned in markets by 
the presence of but a few firms in an industry, political scientists such as William H. 
Riker in The Theory of Political Coalitions cast a broader substantive net while focusing 
on the cooperative game theory that von Neumann and Morgenstern offered. This net 
ranged from predicting coalitions in legislatures and parliaments to understanding stability 
in international systems, but the focus revealed the far more disquieting fact that the 
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concept of rationality itself, of utility maximization, was ill defined. If von Neumann and 
Morgenstern, aided by Nash's definition of noncooperative equilibria, showed that 
interdependent choice per se was not a bugaboo, they failed to show that the paradigm 
had anything whatsoever to say about cooperative decision making. 
Ostensibly, von Neumann and Morgenstern's The Theory of Games and Economic 
B ehavior makes two profound contributions. It shows us how to model and analyze two 
seemingly distinct situations: those in which interdependent decisions are noncooperative 
(participants cannot form binding contractual arrangements), and those that are 
cooperative (in which binding agreements are possible). Although their theory of the first 
situation, when expressed in the context of its extensive form representation, could be 
connected to the classical form of the paradigm, no such connection was evident for their 
theory of the second situation. Both their characteristic function representation of the 
value of coalitions -- of alternative contractual arrangements -- as well as the V-set 
solution that they proposed to treat cooperative games were ad hoc, with virtually no 
theoretical justification. Certainly, these two ideas could not be deduced from any 
general assumptions about utility maximization. Even one of the theory's founders 
surmised that, as formulated, it had a fundamental flaw -- that if people learned the 
theory, they might seek to avoid its consequences, thereby invalidating its predictions 
(Morgenstern and Schowdiauer, 1976). 
Not surprisingly, then, aside from the reformulation of classical microeconomic theory 
as a cooperative game (see the contemporary research of Herbert Scarf, Robert Aumann, 
and Martin Shubik and the classical foundation established by Edgeworth), economists 
largely ignored cooperative game theory as originally formulated. But rather than grapple 
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with the. problem of developing a better theory, the economist's research here-­
consisting of the formulation of market games, of nonatomic games, and of the 
development of value theory -- was less fundamentally conceptual and more an exercise in 
pure mathematics. Instead, a fuller explication of the paradigm's inadequacies and 
attempts at resolving unanswered theoretical questions were left in the decades of the 
60's and the 70's to game theorists such as John Harsanyi, and to political scientists, 
sociologists, and psychologists (e.g. William Riker, Robert Axelrod, Anatol Rapoport, 
Howard Rosenthal, James Laing, Robert Caplow, Abraham DeSwann). Much of this 
research, admittedly, was no less ad hoc than von Neumann and Morgenstern's original 
effort. Certainly the notions of connected or minimal variance coalitions that some 
hypothesized to explain and predict coalitions in parliamentary governments in a spatial 
context could not be deduced from rationality postulates, Riker's "size principle" dealt 
with a special case and assumed the inadequate characteristic function representation of 
situations, and theories about "coalitions in the triad,' or theories applied to majority 
voting games were hardly general. Moreover, the mathematical formulations of these ideas 
were frequently inelegant. But what these efforts reveal is a groping, not on the part of 
economists, but on the part of others, with the paradigm's fundamental inadequacy. 
Today we see a rekindling of the economist's interest in the problems that 
cooperative game theory seeks to treat. This interest is in part brought on by the 
development of new equilibrium concepts and more sophisticated methods for studying 
sequential and extensive form games. The distinction between game theorist and 
economist is now blurred, and the result is the promise that noncooperative game theory 
will soon accommodate those choice situations that von Neumann and Morgenstern sought 
to treat with their cooperative theory. However, even if we admit that economists are on 
the forefront of developments in game theory, that development is not confined to the 
discipline of economics. Although most political scientists are content with consuming the 
game theorist's product, the problems that political science brings to this research has a 
profound effect on theory. 
For example, if we approach cooperative game theory along the same avenue as the 
one proposed originally by von Neumann and Morgenstern (via the characteristic function 
representation), we learn quickly that derivative solution hypotheses such as the V-set and 
the various bargaining sets do not exist in general or that they make silly predictions 
when preferences are of the sort introduced by Black. Indeed, the spatial preferences 
that Black introduced provides, in conjunction with a specific concern with majority rule 
voting games, a general setting for developing and testing alternative hypotheses. 
Political science is also especially concerned with the impact of institutional structures or, 
in the case of international relations, with systems that either have no structure or with 
structures that must be treated as endogenous. This concern forces the game theorist to 
be especially cognizant of those aspects of the environment that constrain individual 
decisions, and with developing a theory that permits institutional structure to be an 
element of the strategy set of decision makers. 
What ought to be emphasized here is that research into cooperative game theory 
differs importantly from previous applications of the paradigm to politics. In following 
Downs, Black, and Arrow, political scientists accepted the paradigm, and molded new 
theoretical results around it. Here, however, we see the joint development of a 
fundamental part of the paradigm itself. There cannot be any economic imperialism in 
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this context simply because the economists did not have a fully developed theoretical 
structure to transmit. 
4. Public Choice
If an argument can be made that the imperialism of economics is something more 
than the mere transmittal of its paradigm, that argument must be made in the context of 
research that we can loosely place under the rubric Public Choice. Foregoing an accurate 
accounting of the contributions of numerous contemporary scholars, and with all due 
apologies to historians such as Charles Beard, we might date the infusion into political 
science of ideas from such fields as public finance and social welfare with the publication 
of James Buchanan and Gordon Tullock's seminal volume The Calculus of Consent. 
Buchanan and Tullock's volume begins with a simple and seemingly self-evident 
premiss: The variety of institutions, procedures, constitutions, and the like that are 
designed to effect the allocation of scarce resources are human creations, and as such 
their development, form, and existence can be understood only by a general understanding 
of the purposes they serve, of the individual objectives they satisfy, and of the 
consequences to individual decision makers of alternative institutions. Even so simple a 
procedure.as pairwise majority-rule voting has many challengers, such as unanimity, 
dictatorship, 2/3's voting, 3/4's voting, etc. To understand why majority rule is adopted 
in lieu of these alternatives, then, we must understand, from each participant's 
perspective, the potential costs and benefits of one rule as against another. 
As simple as this idea appears, its consequences escape the minds of a great many 
people. Neo-liberals who argue or act in the mistaken belief that the "public good" can 
be achieved by willing it -- that all one need do to implement as particular policy is to 
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devise, say, a regulatory agency empowered to implementing that policy -- fail to grasp 
the implications of Buchanan and Tullock's argument. Those who implicitly or explicitly 
suppose that disarmament ends war;· that welfare programs end poverty, or that education 
expenditures terminate illiteracy and ignorance, fail to understand that whatever 
institution we establish to achieve some end, that institution will endure only if it serves 
the purposes of various individuals. And to understand how those institutions might 
function, or how they might be subsequently modified, we must understand what 
individuals are relevant, what ends they pursue, and how other rules and institutions mold 
their interactions. 
A central thrust of Buchanan's research has been to render the field of public 
finance less normative and more descriptive -- or at least to ensure that its normative 
prescriptions are descriptively realistic. With Tullock, his call for descriptive realism is 
extended to the study and evaluation of all institutions -- fiscal or otherwise. The 
consequences of these ideas have been profound not just for economists but for political 
scientists as well. We can trace to them the establishment of the interdisciplinary Public 
Choice Society and its journal Public Choice, the writings of Mancur Olson, especially his 
Logic of Collective Action, as well as William Niskanen's Bureaucracy and Representative 
Government, and even perhaps the development of models of principle-agent relationships 
(although here, the ideas seem to come more from accounting). And since the publication 
of The Calculus of Consent, political scientists have felt compelled to become more 
familiar with indifference curves, supply and demand curves, concepts of elasticity, market 
equilibrium, efficiency, public and private goods, and consumer surplus, as well as journals 
such the Journal of Political Economy, Public Finance, The National Tax Journal, and The 
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Journal of Pu!Jlic Economics. Thus, if we are to find the imperialism of economics in a 
pure form, we ought to find it here. 
But if we examine the flow of ideas more deeply, the nature of this presumed 
imperialism becomes less clear. Consider Olson's influential Logic of Collective Action. 
From the view of formal economic theory, there is little in this monograph that we 
cannot attribute instead to economists such as Samuelson, Pigou, or Pareto. Its 
contribution, however, is the interpretation given to the concepts of public vs. private 
goods, externalities, and the causes of market failure. Quite directly, Olson transforms 
our thinking about interest group politics, neo-Marxist theories, and the nature of 
revolution, while simultaneously questioning the Madisonian premise that threatened 
interests in a democracy will defend those interests and produce an efficient balance of 
forces. New ideas entered the political scientist's dialogue such as political 
entrepreneurship as well as the possibility that the causes of government "failure" may be 
as general and as theoretically identifiable as those linked to market failures. 
But if we ask what cleared the path to this achievement in political science, our 
answer seems to be that political scientists somehow forgot their roots even as they 
studied them. Consider. for example, the following well known quotation from Rousseau's 
Discourse on the Origin and Basis of Inequali ty Among Men: 
If a group of [men] set out to take a deer, they are fully aware that they 
would all have to remain faithfully at their posts in order to succeed: but if a 
hare happens to pass near one of them, there can be no doubt that he pursued 
it without qualm., and that once he had caught his prey, he cared very little 
whether or not he had made his companions miss theirs. 
or this insight of David Hume in A Treatise on Human Nature: 
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It is very difficult, and indeed impossible, that a thousand persons should 
agree in any such action: it being difficult for them to concert so complicated a 
design, and still more difficult for them to execute it; while each seeks a 
pretext to free himself of the trouble and expense, and would lay the whole 
burden on others. 
or, finally, this passage from Hobbes's Leviathan, 
Whatsoever therefore is consequent to a time to Warre, where every man is 
Enemy to every man; the same is consequent to the time wherin men live 
without other security, than what their own strength, and their own invention 
shall furnish them withal!. In such condition, there is no place for industry; 
because the fruit thereof is uncertain: and consequently no Culture of the 
Earth; no Navigation; no use of the commodities that may be imported by Sea; 
no commodious Building; ·no instruments of moving and removing such things as 
require much force; no knowledge of the face of the Earth; no account of 
Time; no Arts; no Letters; no Society; and worst of all, continuall feare and 
danger of violent death; and the life of man, solitary, poore, nasty, brutish, and 
short. 
If anything, these well known passages raise the question: How did political scientists fail 
to develop the ideas of private vs. public goods, in conjunction with a formalization of 
ideas such as the prisoners' dilemma implicit in classical writings? And since equivalent 
quotations can be found in the writings of such practical political scientists as James 
Madison or Thomas Jefferson, we are lead to ask: Why was it not the case the political 
science assumed the imperialistic mantle attributed to economics? 
It is beyond the scope of this essay to seek satisfactory answers to this question, 
but this much is evident: Although 20th century economics provides the precise definition 
and formal refinement of ideas such as Pareto optimality, externalities, and jointly 
supplied goods, as well as an exact formulation of the relationship of these ideas for 
decentralized social processes, "refinement" is the proper word since many of those same 
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ideas were perceived by social theorists at least two hundred years earlier. But even if 
those concepts remained central to political thinking in this century, with no explicit 
paradigm to hold them in place, we were not assured that all thinking remained consistent 
with them. Economics appears imperialistic, then, not merely because of its formalism, 
but because its paradigm cements these concepts into an integrated theoretical structure 
that allows us to see their generality. 
A useful example of the economist's and the political scientist's relative contribution 
in this area concerns the issue of government growth. One of the principle empirical 
regularities that we can observe about social processes today is the increasing size and 
domain of the public sector in nearly all countries. This growth is especially perplexing if 
we also accept the proposition that much of what governments do is economically 
inefficient -- that there are a variety of decentralized mechanisms for achieving 
equivalent ends at considerably reduced social cost. The question then becomes: What 
accounts for this seemingly pervasive and increasingly prevalent form of "social 
irrationality?" 
Numerous economists have sought answers to this question using the tools normally 
at their disposal, such as the concepts of fiscal illusion and the relative costs of labor 
versus capital intensive activity. But none of these explanations is generally adequate, 
and instead research has focused on more game-theoretic ideas such as the inefficiencies 
associated with prisoners' dilemma situations (for a survey see Aranson and Ordeshook 
1985). If markets fail whenever costs are private and certain goods are public, then the 
public sector can "fail" as well because, even in regulating the supply of public goods, it 
must confer private benefits (e.g., benefits to interests groups) at public cost. Thus, the 
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public sector is the dual of the private sector, and the inefficiencies possible in markets 
find their counterpart in governmental activity. 
Understanding how such inefficiencies arise and are maintained, however, cannot 
rely on the mathematical relationships among marginal utilities that show the inefficiency 
of the private sector with respect to public goods. Instead, the processes of 
representative government must be modeled, and the imperatives of election and voting 
uncovered. All of this, of course, takes us back to the problem of applying the paradigm 
to non-economic institutions, in which case essentially non-economic notions of equilibria 
must be applied. Once again, then, we see that although economics provides the initial 
insight in the form of a precise theoretical representation of key concepts (externalities 
and public goods), theorizing must proceed anew. 
Today, then, Rousseau's ideas or Hobbes's or Hume's or Riker's or Dahl's or Key's or 
Buchanan's or Tullock's or Olson's can be compared, and their logical connections 
assessed. What emerges from volumes such as The Calculus of Consent and The Logic o f  
Collec tive Action is an economic imperialism that takes the form, not of the transmittal 
of specific laws or the adaptation of theorems about supply and demand or even, 
necessarily, insights that were not gained by less precise methods, but rather of the 
extension of a paradigm that formalizes those ideas and establishes their generality. 
5. Conclusions 
Although the rational-choice paradigm may not yet be the dominant paradigm of 
political science, it is the most prominent. It serves today as the successor to the 
"behavioralist revolution" of the 50's and 60's and so it seems only reasonable to 
anticipate that the study of politics and of economics can once again become wholly 
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integrated disciplines. This i s  not t o  say, of course, that we can anticipate the eminent 
demise of disciplinary boundaries within universities. Bureaucratic inertia is a heavy 
burden, and political scientists and economists do not always share substantive concerns. 
Nor should we suppose, even as the perceived domain of the paradigm expands, that 
complete integration is a necessary byproduct. Other paradigms will remain active in 
political science. 
A simple example illustrates this point. It is now generally believed that voting in 
mass elections is, for the rational-choice paradigm at least, a paradox. Given that the 
probability of one's vote being decisive for choosing a winner is so slight (even zero) and 
given the evident cost of voting, no rational calculus seems capable of explaining the act 
of voting without recourse to assumptions about benefits from citizen duty and the like 
(Riker and Ordeshook 1968). But scholars whose research lies imbedded in the paradigm 
regard such assumptions as ad hoc and unacceptable. They contest the assumptions with 
the argument that although costs are evident and probabilities are an essential component, 
admitting the presumed psychic rewards of merely choosing an act renders the paradigm 
tautological. Such attitudes, however, highlight the myopia that emerges if we depend on 
a single paradigm that cannot explain everything. Voting is a paradox only if we assume 
that the sole "objectively real" utility terms are private costs and the public benefits 
associated with choosing one candidate as against another. Private benefits associated 
with interpreting an action as a consumption good are not "objectively present" and thus 
seem out of place if they are included in the analysis. However, this reasoning also leads 
to the conclusion that eating, for example, is a paradoxical act. After all, eating is 
costly (in terms of time and the resources spend for food), and these costs must exceed 
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the benefits associated with one's slight contribution towards the public outcome of 
reducing world hunger. Hence, the choice of nearly any act becomes paradoxical with an 
appropriate conceptualization of the decision problem. Of course, common sense tells us 
that we eat to ensure the private benefit of survival; but is that any more real than 
voting to ensure the private benefit of feeling good that we have participated in a 
democratic act. 
We can be led to inaccurate conceptualizations of a person's decision calculus, of 
course, because the paradigm is silent on the basic sources of people's preferences and on 
the determinants of their perceptions of the situations that confront them. Designing 
alternative conceptualizations and making an appropriate selection are inventive 
enterprises, and the paradigm places only modest constraints on our creativity. And more 
to the point, we may have to rely on other disciplines (e.g., psychology) for guidance 
about these matters. 
There are indications, moreover, that other paradigms will influence that of rational 
choice, but if some of these changes 
'
occur outside of economics, then whatever imperial 
position we are willing today to attribute to this discipline will dissipate. Because 
economics is arguably more advanced in the use of the rational-choice paradigm -- at 
least in the mathematics of that paradigm -- it is reasonable to anticipate that we should 
see changes there first. One source of change may be the increasing realization, deriving 
from a considerable body of experimental research in economics, decision theory, and 
psychology that the axioms of cardinal utility abstract greatly from the actual decision 
processes of people. Alternative axiom systems may be devised, but the fact remains that 
the simplification that von Neumann and Morgenstern proposed ignores much of reality. A 
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second source of change derives from Herbert Simon's early notions of bounded rationality 
and from attempts at incorporating some of the lessons of modern genetics into a more 
comprehensive theory of economic systems. Although a variety of dynamic models abound 
in economics, economic theory has little to say about truly dynamic systems in which 
alternative institutional structures emerge and decline. Just as the state has expanded in 
this century and regulatory activity increased and declined in the United States, market 
structure is not static, and the truly profound questions concern that nature of this 
dynamic -- the dynamics of social organization. 
Hints of changes in the paradigm appear in economics, but generally we see a natural 
resistance to such ideas. It took game theory nearly forty years to enter the mainstream 
of economic theorizing, and today most practitioners still prefer using some standardized 
tools of their craft, such as Kuhn - Tucker conditions for optimization, classical 
formulations of consumer preferences and firm objective functions, and arguments drawn 
from basic notions of supply and demand. These are powerful tools; nevertheless, we 
should predict that economics will be changed by its success in transmitting to other 
disciplines the parts of that paradigm that it develops. To the extent that practitione�s 
from other disciplines become skilled in the application and interpretation of the rational­
choice paradigm, they will begin changing the paradigm to suit their needs and in 
response to their disciplines' prejudices about reality. Put simply, even the formalism of 
the paradigm no longer belongs to economics -- it has become fair game to a great many 
disciplines not merely as a target for criticism, but now as a target for theorizing. 
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